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Measuring thoughts and thinkers: why the ongoing conflict
about measuring the value of science and humanities may be
ultimately fruitless
Small competitions, such as the BBC/AHRC New Generation Thinkers scheme, preserve the
essential features of larger assessments of research quality such as the REF, argues Jon
Adams. But what does it mean to compare achievements in such disparate fields as history
and physics?
The BBC and AHRC recently ran a joint competit ion to locate ten ‘New Generation Thinkers’,
a talent scheme f or “emerging academics with a passion f or communicating the excitement
of  modern scholarship to a wider audience and who have an interest in broader cultural
debate”. The chosen ten f or 2011 were Alexandra Harris, University of  Liverpool; Corin Throsby, University
of  Cambridge; David Petts, Durham University; Laurence Scott, Kings College London; Lucy Powell,
University College London; Philip Roscoe, University of  St. Andrews; Rachel Hewitt, Queen Mary, University
of  London; Shahidha Bari, Queen Mary, University of  London; and Zoe Norridge, University of  York, and
f inally myself .
When the results came in, some people, inevitably, f elt the ten they selected were the wrong ten. The
objections raised an interesting counterf actual: if  not us, then who? And that, in its turn, raises another
interesting question: what criteria ought to be used to select the ten best thinkers? Is it even a sensible
task?
Maybe ten is the problem – maybe it calls f or an unavailable precision. So let’s say the ranking is looser –
just corral the top 500, without ordering within that set. That looks easier, but it would still be a ranking
problem – it would still have threshold cases (who would be number 501?), and it would still have
composition problems (what if  the top 500 were all physicists?).
You might object on Kuhnian grounds, complaining that the really good thinkers would be impossible to
identif y using our current cognitive f ramework – that the task of  identif ying good thinkers was always a
retrospective one, something possible only af ter the revolutions their thoughts triggered.
Research bodies and competit ion
But while that’s a conscientious objection, it ’s not a usef ul one when we really need to rank thinkers. And
we really do. For even if  the question of  how to rank thinkers and thoughts is relatively f rivolous and
inconsequential in this f orm, the question has a serious version: I argue that this type of  competit ion is a
pocket-sized version of  the problem f aced by research bodies and government agencies tasked with
distributing f inite (and increasingly scarce) resources. Scaled up, the analogous problem of  how to identif y
which are the best institutions, departments, and academics to support – ult imately, how much to spend on
which universit ies – is hugely signif icant. And that task is also a task about ranking thoughts and their
thinkers.
However distastef ul the task, it needs to be done. So how? Well I don’t have a how. What I do have are a
f ew whys that might point to (or usef ully exclude) hows. To wit: Why is this sort of  macro- level assessment
so upsetting f or academics? Why is “impact” particularly upsetting? And why, more generally, might the
problem of  macro- level assessment be intractable here?
Ranking thinkers, ranking disciplines
Measuring intelligence has had a bad reputation f or a long time now. Indeed, one thing intelligent people
seem to agree upon is that intelligence isn’t the type of  thing that can be quantif ied in this f ashion. But
although there is a widespread resistance to measuring intelligence generally, there is much less resistance
to measuring specif ic intelligences. Examinations (f or matriculation) and peer-review (f or publication)
provide quite f ine-grained means of  ranking academics.
Generally, we have good mechanisms f or ranking within disciplines, but we’re much less sure about how to
rank between them. There might even be something f undamentally inappropriate about this sort of  inter-
disciplinary ranking. Each discipline is surely good f or a dif f erent purpose, and, as Richard Rorty once
pointed out, it doesn’t make sense to rank the tools in a toolbox. By this account, disciplines are task
specif ic and theref ore categorically incomparable. There is no ‘level f ield’ on which they can be sensibly
compared. Trying to f ind the best thinkers is like asking “who is the world’s best sportsperson?” – the
question will remain divisive (and any answer elusive) because the category is simply too broad.
To expand: those attributes which make Rory McIlroy a
good golf er contribute very litt le to Usain Bolt’s success,
and by the time you have squared of f  all the discipline-
specif ic skills separating McIlroy f rom Bolt, all you have
lef t is two healthy and dedicated men in their early
twenties. The common denominators are too common to
capture the particularity of  each man’s achievements.
Perhaps academic disciplines are similarly
incommensurable?
The “two cultures” debate
“Comparisons between orders so disparate are
meaningless,” said F. R. Leavis, replying to C. P. Snow’s claim that scientif ic argument was “usually much
more rigorous and almost always at a higher conceptual level, than a literary person’s arguments.” The
exchange was part of  the “two cultures” debate, f ought 50 years ago over two competing def init ions of
culture. The heat of  the argument was generated by the subtext – who was smarter: people in the
humanities, or people in the sciences?
By the 1990s, when the conf lict reignited into the ‘Science Wars’, that subtext was explicit – with Raymond
Tallis, a medical doctor and philosopher, inveighing that “those whose experience of  disciplined thought has
been conf ined to the humanities… cannot be considered adequately educated.”
This ongoing conf lict between the sciences and the humanities has been stimulating and productive f or
scholars on both sides precisely because the humanities and the sciences do such dif f erent things that we
can’t usef ully compare them, so disputants will be unlikely to f ind enough common ground to achieve
argumentative closure.
Again, were comparisons at this level meaningf ul, the dispute about which is best wouldn’t still be ongoing.
So Leavis was right. But f or the f unding allocation problem, comparisons between orders so disparate are
necessary.
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